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PREFACE 
In presenting this thesis ., the author has purposed to 
set f'orth in sequence the political background., aims, ob-
jectives, workings and accomplishments of the London Naval 
Conf'erence of 1930., and to present to the reader a concise 
p1cturo of conditions that rendered this splendid objective 
impotent and brou.ght to f'utility all the earnest endeavors 
of the great peace loving statesmen of the nations involved. 
The aut11or desires to express his sincere appreciation 
to Dr. T. H. Reynol ds f'or his very kind asgiatance and pat-
ience as his adviser, and to the Librarians both at Oklahoma 
A. and M. College and at Oklahoma. University for their able 
assistance 1n collecting the materials used in this thesis . 
Oklahoma A. and 1.1. College 
Stillwater 
Au.gust 26., 1940 . 
W. H. K . 
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CHAPTER I 
DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM 
1916-1929 
In the early part of 1916 President ilson made one 
of his famous "sw around the circle" tours through t e 
middle estern part of the United States and delivered a 
series of speeches on a program of preparedness . 1lson 
did not desire to tbro the United States into the Euro-
pean conflict , but he did see the dire need of adequate 
protection against invasion. While on this tour, he 
spoke at t e Coliseum, st. Louis, ssouri, Feb . 3, 1916 . 
In his address the President made his momentous pronounce-
ment of the new naval polic of the United States , which 
was intended to safeguard the 11genuine neutrality" a ainst 
submarine warfare and against the allied blockade . In this 
address he said , in part: 
Theda er is not from ithin, gentlemen; it is 
from without---the commanders of submarines have their 
instructions and those instructions for the most part 
are consistent with the law of nations, but one reckless 
commander of a submarine, choosing to put his own pri-
vate interpretation upon what his government wishes him 
to do , ht set the world on fire--There are cargoes 
of cotton on the seas; there are cargoes of wheat on the 
seas; there are cargoes of manufactured goods on the 
seas; and ever one of those cargoes may bet e point 
of ignition, because everj cargo oes into t e field 
of fire . l 
lRay Stannard Baker, The New De ocracy, Presidential 
essagea, Addressee and other Papers (1913- 1917) b 
Woodrow ilson, II , ~. ~ 
2 
President 1lson pointed out further 1.n his address 
that, in his opinion, the United States should have a navy 
more adequate than any other nation in the world . In call-
ing for a program that would give the United States the 
largest navy in the world, he emphasized the vast coast 
line that she bad to fortify and protect . 
President Wilson made this tour of the middle western 
states to arouse the people of the United States to the ne-
cessity of preparing for any emergenc that might arise 
due to the war that was then raging 1n Europe. This, in 
itself, as the beginning of a pro am of national defense 
and preparedness that paved the y for the h e armament 
pro am that followed . The president carried his program 
to the people simply because CongrQss had refused to carry 
out his suggestions. The following current comment shows 
pretty well the sentiment of the public regarding his move: 
Apathy in Congress and dissension in his own par-
ty have forced President ilson to carry the case of 
preparedness before the real court of author1ty-- the 
men and women of the U .S . The public will el come 
this course and nothing but good 111 result . 2 
The speech at St . Louis was his last before he returned 
to ,ashington . Bewildered surprise seemed to be the first 
reaction of editorial writers throughout the country to 
ilson's assertion that the American navy ought to be the 
greatest in the world . This attitude was followed by one 
of solidarit 1n an opinion very much 1n harmony with that 
2Editor1al, 'President Rousing The Nation for Prepar-
edness ", Literary Digest, February 5, 1916. 
3 
of the president. Evidence of his first victory in Con-
gress came when both houses of that body decisively de-
feated the "Gore Resolution", a resolution that erippled 
the President's negotiations with Germany. Thi s c ange 
of opinion soon brought about a vast armament and naval 
building program with Co reas furnishing all of the ne -
cessary funds . 3 
The u. s. entered the war, and her fleet grew stead-
ily until, ill 1919, when the Versailles Oonf'ePence opened, 
its shadow loomed darkly across the Atlantic . In rch 
1919, at Paris , Mr . alter Long, the First Lord of The Ad-
miralty, expressed his alarm to Mr . Daniels, and stated 
that Llo:yd George could not support the ideas oft e Lea e 
of Nations unless the United States would agree to cut her 
big naval pr~grrun .4 
Lord Robert Cecil was equally perturbed, and on April 
a, 1919, wrote to Colonel House, urging abandonment of the 
naval pro am on the plea that competition in a 
between the two chief supporters of the Lea e of Nations 
would doom it to complete ater111t or worse . To Colonel 
House, Lord Cecil wrote: 
dear Colonel House: 
I have found in exalted quarters that some of 
the recent utterances by high officials connected with 
the U. S. navy have produced a very uni'ort~mate impres-
3co~ress1onal Record, Congress, Ses s ion, LIII, part 4, 
34 • 
4Kenneth G. B. Dewar, "The Naval Conference of 1930", 
1920, CVII, 285 . 
sion. Very possibly they have been misunderstood, 
but they have 1n fact conveyed the idea that the 
naval policy of America is one of expansion: that 
the .American ambition 1a to have a navy at leas 
as strong or stro er than that of the British Em-
pire, and so on. It is urged with some force that 
such an attitude is holl inconsistent w-lth the con-
ception of the Lea e of Nations, and that if it 
reall represents the settled policy of the United 
States, it could onl lead sooner or later to a com-
petition in anns bet een u s and them. To inaugurate 
the League of Nations by a competition in armaments 
between its to chief supporters would doom it to 
co plete sterility or worse.5 
The above letter was discussed by the President and 
Colonel House, and it was decided that ilson should auth-
orize r. House to repl, agreeing to provide discussions 
bet een the two governments regarding naval build of the 
future, but hinting that the naval program. already voted by 
Con eas would not be considered. lith these facts 1n 
mind Colonel House wrote to Lord Cecil: 
I am sure you will find the United States ready to 
abandon or modify our new naval progr ob which I 
Understood you to mean our programme not yet provided 
for b law, as our naval bill for the next fiscal 
year has not yet been passed. I am certain that you 
will find us ready and illing to consult 1th the 
British government from year to year re~arding the 
naval pro ra:mme of the two governments. 
Thus a foundation for a disarmament program was laid 
bet een the two most powerful nations at the Versailles 
Conference. It as clearly recognized by both of these 
countries that there must be a definite disar.:na.ment plan 
set £orth b the League of Nations . The delogates at the 
5charles Seymour, The Intimate Pa§ers of Colonel House, 
4 Vols ., {Boston and ew York, 1 28), IV, 418. 
6Ib1d. , 421 . 
5 
Versailles Conference realized the inportance of the 
problem of disarmament and were very conscious of the 
fact that the a.r which had brought them to Paris was 
a direct result of the failure of the nations to solve 
that problem. And., until it as solved., such mrs as 
they had just been through ere a sure to come as the 
dawn of a ne d Tho peace conference recognized a 
limitation of national ar ento as the very cornerstone 
of the foundation that it was ttempting to lay for a 
lasting peace , and in two very important chapters of the 
final treaty it pled ed itself to hat could be done to 
bring it about. 7 In Article 8 of the covenant, it was 
stated: 
1 e embers of the League recognize that the a1n 
tens.nee of peace requires the reduction of national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with nnt-
iona.l safety and the enforcement of common action of 
international obligations. The council., taking ac-
count of the geographical situation and circumstances 
of each state, shn.11 formulate plans for such reduc-
t on--such plans shall lead to reconsideration and 
revision at lea t every ten (10) years . a 
This was the fo dation for the conferences of orld pow-
era regard t e question of d aarmament programs. 
France , hovever , in her contention regardi an arma-
ment arrangement between t e powers, wished the Lea e to 
possess sufficient m111t ry and naval forces to arantee 
her safety against the repetition of an invasion by a re-
7Ed.ward. M. House,~ Reall.y Happened At Paris, (New 
York, 1921), 371. 
8°The Covenant of The League of Nations", World Peace 
Foundation, III, July, 1920, 3. 
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juvenated German. The original Freno project for a 
League of atlons submitted to the commission, but not 
taken as a basis of discussion called for: 
A :militar forces pplied b the various member 
sta.tes- - to investigate all military questions af-
fecting the League and to inspect international 
forces and armaments in various countries.9 
On the to bjects of an international arm and arm.ru.ients 
control, tle deb tes iere prolonged, but France as finall 
forced to drop her demands for an international army and an 
international staff . How ver, she fought etro ly for a 
permanent bod to plan and prepare the military and naval 
program. In her desire for protection and safety, France 
finally consented tote plan prepared b Lloyd George and 
~ oodro ilson, and, upon the advice of Clemenceau, at a 
moment en ever delegate at the convention expected t e 
debate to open, ~oted unanimousl to accept the Lea e of 
Nations .10 
France supported to Lea e of ations on the definite 
understanding that t c United States and Great Britain 
ould rantee the security of France . The United Sta.tea 
Senate rejected tho Versailleo Treaty primarily because 
of the League of Nations , thereby depriving France of the 
protection that she desired and felt, at the time of her 
acceptance of the League, t t she as getting . 
9n. H. liller, The Drafting of The Covenant, 2 Vols., 
(Ne York, 1928J: I, 207. - -
10George B. Noble., Policies and Opinions at Paris, 
1919, (Iew York, 1935), 14~ ~ 
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Follo ing the close of the Versa111es Conference, 
t e rejection of tho treaty by the United States Senate, 
and the negotiat of a separate peace with Ge y, 
the orld powers met at ashington , D. C. 1n 1921, in an 
initial attempt to carry out tho foundational plans for 
dis ent . 
It as at the as ·ngton Conference that • Hughes 
dropped a bo bshell by making a definite proposal for the 
dostruct1on of a number of specific shipa . 11 To say t t 
the French were not pleased at these proposals at the 
conference would be putting it ver mildly, but the Ameri -
can proposals ere Bound and practical, because the aim 
of the United States s parit . ¥ en tho conference 
ended, the American People thought that it had been achieved 
in all classes of ships . This was not the case. A defi-
nite proposal had been presented b the United States to 
limit the total tonnage of cruisers and destro ers to 
450,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, but 
at om. discussion on submarines intervened and the ole 
queation was s elvcd . 
The conference at .ashint,;ton ended '11th parity in 
battleships 1th the ration of 5- 5- 3-12 -12 for the five 
po ers of the United States of Anerlca , the British Em-
piro, France , Ital, and Japan. B the 7ashington Treat , 
llNaval ~ ar College , International ar Documents, Con-
ferenc'e'on the Limitation of Arma.m~ts, 1921, (\aah-
.-,£on, !'9231'";" 7-14 . - -
8 
the United States ms to retain a total of 500 , 650 tons 
in co. it 1 ships; the British Empire , 580 , 450 tons; 
ranee , 221 , 170 tons; Itul, 182, 800 tons and J apan, 
01 , 320 tons .12 
he tot 1 ca ital sip replacement tonna e of each 
of the contracting powers ~as not tc exceed in standard 
displacement , for the U. s . , 525 , 000 tons; for the Drit~ 
ish Empire , 525, 000 tons; for France , 175, 000 tons; for 
Ital , 175 , 000 tons , and for Japan, 315, 000 tons . 13 Uone 
of the contractin po ers 1 ~ to construct a capital ship 
c cecdin 35 , 000 tons . 
Accord.ingl , b t e te of t e · o.shington rco. t , 
the U. S . proceeded to scrap tent - el t battleships , 
£if een tbat she as ten buil ing Elild thirteen old onen . 
Great Britain followed sit b scrapping t1cnt u1lt and 
four t t she s buil ing. 14 'his 1as a big c ·eve-
ment , but it left France dissatiofied it the ratio al-
lotted to her .15 
Great Britain and Japan procee ed to dosign and l ay 
do ten- thousand- ton cruisers, since the Treaty of '!ash-
ington covered onl t e retainJ.ng, and scrapping or build-
of capital ships . B 1926 bot oft ese countries were 
l2Ib1d . , 295 . 
13Ibid. , 296. 
14Ibid . , 302- 207. 
15Po.ul Choe, "French Naval Policy", Brasseys Annual, 
1930, 67 . 
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superior ~o the nitod States 1n the cl as oft e ten-
thous - ton cruisers . Suddenl t U. s . woke to the 
act t ts e bad onl t ten- t' o~sand- to cruisers 
a ainat six for each the Britis h and Japanese had. 15 
It was the business o.f the League of Ii atlons to dis-
cover some ath to disar et . Finall , 1n ecemb-er , 
192 , there wa oonstitut ~ b t e council oft e League 
.f 1! ions t i,r arator co ttee. It as t e spe-
cific dut of this committee to rrange or d1aa1"mB.nlent 
conference •17 s co ittoe met .for its 1rst se s lon 
on a 16 , 1 2. 
c aahington Conference had faiied to settle the 
question of tonnage ratio o.f submarines and c isers , so 
t· o .first pro le of the prep ratory committoe was one 
of a co ' le issue , since Gre t Britain and Japan had one 
terla.l y e in t building of ten- thousand-to cru1-
sers. 
Brie.fl , it as the consensus of opinion that erica 
d bee tricked out of p rit in the ashington Conference. 
Te csident , resorting once more to his constitutional 
aut ority, proposed another coni'erenco , ere additional 
attempts m1 ht be e to disa • ranee and Ital sent 
flat, but pol.ite ref'usals . Great Britain, the U. s . and 
Jo.po.n met at Geneva on Juno 2, 1927 . This conference 
16rbid., 287. 
-c-..-....:- 1~cbarl Livermore , Fifth Yearbook of The League 
fl!. Nations , (Brookl , 1925), 57. - -
lO 
oco bsol tel no~ ng, nnd cmne to a eonclus-
ion s e r.l 
Follo eva Coni'a ence, there c C e el-
1o at Par on A t 27, 192D, 1n ch all 
of e loa · o er3 r 0 Ced s an inst 
naUona1 ollc. 
f'ollo db e erican Cruis r ill pro-
viding tor f'll'toen n eru!s rs and rerat't carri r. 
bill s ed b Pro Coolid on February 
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poasessed the naval instruments of warfare , the other 
side followed suit in order to gunrantoe security. 
Back of the big battleship was the de i ner o 
a very anxious to have his coimtry continue to use 
ships of his creation. 
The number and size of battleships are governed by 
the battle fleet strength of possible opponents, b t the 
number and size of cruisers depend mainly upon the inter-
sts they have to defend. The U.S. as ver desirous to 
have parity in this class w1 th Gr at Britain. 20 
The destroyer 1s really a small cruiser required for 
purposes of torpedo attack and defense with the battle 
fleet, for anti- submarine duties, and for the protection 
of trade in te~minal areas. Great Britain propoe d par1t 
r - -
of 200,000 tons. Since the pass1 of the Cruiser Bill 
b the Cong ess of the United States in 1929, the U. s . 
had ained cons dernbl y in t. e cruiser line. To meet the 
above proposal of Great Britain ould mean the destruction 
of ore than 90,000 tons for the U. s .21 
However , prior to the opening of the London Conf'erence , 
there prevailed in the U. s . an atmosphere of optimism. 
This was due largel to the joint work of Ur . Ramse y c-
Donald and President Hoover, and all serious difficulties 
in the naval tonnage question bet een tl1eir respective 
-
1 2orbid . , 292. 
21Ib d ., 293. 
_2 
countries had been ta.ken care of. 
Japsn, from all accounts, was ver anxious to do her 
share in making the conference a success. She s n 
s athy i th the Angl.o-American views on the postponement 
of the capital ship replacements, and on the limitation of 
t e so-called auxiliar craft, i.e., cruisers, destroyers, 
and submarines. The U.S. \1B.S known to f vor an lo-
erican-Japanese pact, in case another fie-po er pact 
failed. 22 
ccor ing to K. K. Kawakami, a Japanese statesman, 
Japan wont to the London Naval Conference with policies and 
demands that ..: ere reasonable. Of this he stated ther: 
hJapan comes to London with a sincere desire to contribute 
towards international harmony and accord. 11 23 
France aa very much afraid of the London l~ val Con-
ference. The Paris Temps doclared in October, 1929: 
All controversies are pro ture. Tho conversations 
between the interested governments from now to Janu-
.,._ry will permit them to reach a basis for understand-
ing on many questions. Upon the question of interde-
pendence b land, sea, and air, France could only ive 
VIO.:J w1 th utmost difficulty.24 
It was quoted .further in the article: 
No ODA knows what the f'uture reserves for nations as 
for n. T t Great Britain and the u. S. have a firm 
22 actor C. Bywater, "The London Naval Conference", The 
Nineteenth Century, CVI, 718. ~ 
J. / 23K. K. K aka.."ni, 11 .Japa.Tl and The London Naval Conference", 
lhe Nineteenth Century, CVI, 142. 
24r.ditorial, JtFrenc Fears of The London Na al Conf'er-
encen , Literary Digest, October 26, 1929, CIII, 15. 
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desire to do the beat in all circ stances to serve 
t e cause of peace rejoices t e vole world. It 
re ins to be :.seen ho l thout a formal alliance and 
ithout a permanent entente, thes to po era 11 
cquit heir dut hile their respective positions, 
their methods of action, and even the condition of 
tleir existence are in no wise the samo .25 
ltho the re arator co ttee o the League of 
Nations had planned tho.t the next naval conference be held 
at Lo don , i...~ Januar, 1930, it ined the dut - of the 
Briti Government to issue the official invit tion to the 
con:.orence. The follo ng is to text of the o£ficial in-
titat on hie· as si e b Arthur He erson, British For-
ei :n Socrot _ , and handed to Ambassador Davis 1n London, 
on October 7 , 1929. It red, in part: 
I ba vo t tO honor to ·· t to our oxcellcnc ·r.l th 
copies of tho notes 1 I run today address ng to the 
French, It lian, an Japanese ambassadors 1n London, 
invitin0 t e Franc, Ita an, and Japanese 0overrn..~ents 
to partic pate inn five poicr conference to deal th 
t c position of naval sa ent, eh it s proposed 
hold in Lon~on to 1 tter part of January next .26 
In the 1.nvitation of the Britis _ Gover!llilent , it 1as stated 
that tl o qucntion of parity, tho destruction of t e fnib-
marine, the uostio_ or dete ing ttleship stre th, 
and tl:ie b ect of national securit were the chief issues 
to be considered t the conference.27 
.J 2srb1d. 
26~. , 16. 
27JD.tles Thayer Gerould, "Invitation to The London Naval 
Conference , 1930", Current History, November , 1929, 
, :.:; 9. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONFERENCE IN SESSION 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to give 
a briof diplomatic or pol itical backsr ound for the call-
ing of the London Naval Conference . Bef'oro going into 
the working of the Conference, it is also necessary to 
review the situation prior to the opening day. 
The proparatory stage of all international confer-
ences is of utm.oat importance. Their success or failure 
m.ay depend upon the extent to which difficulties have 
been foreseon and the thoroughness with which difficul-
ties hAve been removed . The London Naval Conference was 
no exception to this rule . 
It was tlLe speech of Ambassador Hugh Gibson of the 
United States, before the Preparatory Commission at Ge-
neva on April 22, 1929, reflecting as it did the views of 
President Hoover, that off'ered a new basis for tho solu-
tion 0£ the Anglo-American Naval Controversy, and lod to 
tho rcne~1,etl diplomatic negotiations between the :woz-ld' s 
two t;reatast naval powers . I n this address !lr . Gibson 
Daid: 
Our first duty is for each of us to exa:mine all 
phases of the problem before us with a view to dis-
covering what measures of concessions can be offered 
by each delegat1on--------- -----S1nce our last meeting, 
the nations of the world lw.vo bcnm.d themsel ves by sol-
emn 1.mdertaking to reno1.mce war as an instrument of 
15 
national policy. ~e believe that s agreement af-
firming that humanities iill be at peace will adv ce 
t he cause 0£ disarm:imont by removing doubts and fears 
hich have in the past constituted our principal ob-
stacle----------. ~ country1 s defense is primarily 
a naval proble .1 
Thus he based his plea for readjustment on the signing of 
the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war. 
1th the return of 1r. R se f:cDo ld a head of th 
second ritish La.bo Government on y 30, 1929, negoti-
ation.s for the settle nt of the British-American cruiser 
controversy ere begun. The e negotiations continued 
thro out the summer of 1929, and culminatod 1n t e visit 
of the British Prime inister in October . 1th the excep-
tion of a fe technical points an agreement s reached 
on 11 outstanding iss es. :lb.at the Hoover- cDonald a ree-
ment proposed was a settlement of t he cruiser controversy, 
hich d wrecked the Geneva. Conference. At Geneva t e 
United State d asked for parity bet een the fleets of 
the to countries at a tonna e level of 250,000 to 300,000 
tons, each country ba.v t e right build the type of 
vessel best suited to its o needs . Because of its lack 
of naval base, the United States preferred 10, 00 ton 
cruisers th eight inch guns. The British Gover ent on 
t he other hand pre£erred ll six inch gun cruisers and 
asked for a minimum of se enty ships of this class, hich 
1t regarded as indisp nsable for the protection of the far 
1Le pue o Nations onthly Summary, ay, 1929, IX, 
13,..-137-:-
16 
fl trade routes o:f the Empire. The Hoover-l~cDonald 
agreement proposed that the cruiser class be divided into 
ta categories- -large eight inch gun ships and small six 
inch ships . The large ships were to be limited as to 
number and the smaller craft limited as to size . The 
United States was to be allowed a superiority in J.arge 
ships and Britain was to be allo ed superiority LTl the 
smaller ships. 
This provisional settlement, which came to be known 
as the Rapidan agre ent, beaause of its eonel sions during 
the talks bet een the President and the Prime Minister on 
the bnnks o:f the Rapidan River, narro ed the margin o.f 
difference to three eight inch gun cruisers . Great Britain 
abandoned its demand for a total of seventy cruisers and 
a ~reed to a minimum of fifty ships total 339,000 tons . 
Fifteen o these were to be eight inch gun cruisers, hile 
thirty-five were to be smaller six inch gun vessels . The 
United Stat B requ sted twenty- one large eight inch gun 
oru.iaers and enough smaller ones to bring the total to 
315,000 tons. The British ould agree to only eighteen 
large ei <? t inch gun cruisers. It was agreed to leave the 
final settlement of this problem to the Confcrence . 2 
Uo such negotiatio11s were undertaken w-lth France . For 
ten ars France had resisted the ' lo-American method of 
2Publ1cations of the Department of State, Press Re-
leases, London Naval cont., Nos-:-1-13, Oct . 5, Dec. 28, 
1~29, 27- 29. 
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lim.itation., and at Geneva had put .forward a thesis which 
ould make t _e degree of disa ent depend on the extent 
o:f securit. Fu.rte ore, France held that land, air, and 
naval disarmament should be considered aa a ole and not 
separately; and that naval strength should be meas lI'ed by 
total to e and not by cate ories . On December 20, 1929, 
the French Government .fo arded to other naval po ers a 
e orandum setting forth its position . She emphasized the 
following points: 
That the size of the French navy st correspond 
1th national needs, the size o.f the colonial empire, 
ar..d length of trade routes. 
That naval noeds bo modified by nny guarantee 
o:f security g1 1ng ef'f'ect to the Lea.gue of Na tiona s ys-
to of' collective ctlon agalnat an agressor. 
That the Kellogg Pa:ct in its present state cannot 
be regarded as inereas security. 
That naval limitations cannot be achieved solely 
by the application of mathoma.tical ratios. 
That the ark at Geneva revealed the interdepend-
ence of land, air, and naval armam a.3 
Ther were no atte ta to d scuss the above issues 
prior to the opening of the Conf'erence, b t they definitely 
s e France's position on tho tter. 
Following Great Britain's invitation to the Conference, 
diplo atic conversations bet een France and Ital were be-
gun. Italy, follo ing a previously announced policy, de-
clared its readiness to reduce naval armaments to an level 
however low, providiii that it was not exceeded b an 
other Continental European po er. France however took the 
position that naval parity with Italy would in fact mean 
3Ibid. , 102 . 
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inferiorit for France, as th French fleet t patrol 
through seas, while the Italian fleet was coni'ined to the 
editorranean. In its &morandum of December 20th, the 
Frene ove ent suggested as a possible solution of a 
regional problem, a pact alo 
P cific Treaty of the as 
remained ,mset tled, however, 
convened in Januar . 4 
the lines of the Four Power 
on Conference. This issue 
en the London Conference 
On its way to the Conference the Japanese delegation 
stopped at ashington D. c. 1n December and private con-
versations with the American dele ation began. The Japa-
nese claim for a ratio of seventy percent in auxiliary sur-
face craft, and particularly in the category of 10,000 ton 
cruisers, was explained to the American delegates and to 
the press . Points of difference re left for solution at 
the conference. 
The el1m1nary ne ot1at1ona had re.aulted in a virtual 
solution of the outstan differences between the United 
States mid Gr at Britain, and a tentative tonnage a e ent 
based on the lo-American thesis of disarmament . They 
d clar1:f'1ed, but not settled, the erican-Japanese dif-
.ferenccs. No solution for the French isaue of security bad 
been found and no basis for a compromise between France and 
Ital • 5 
4Ibid . , 103. 
5Ibid., 103. 
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The Conference passed thro h three ells tinct phases •. 
The first phase was from the openin.3 of tho session to 
Feb . 17, hen tho fall of the ardieu Cabinet in ce 
forced o. spension of ctivit1es; tho second phase was 
the interlude between Feb . 18 and Mare 6 hen, owin to 
the absence oft e Frenc delegatoa, disc sions ere con-
fLT1ed to matte:t>s concerning the U. S ., Japan, and Great 
Britain, the third phase after the return of the ench 
Delega.tJ.on, en attempts were de to deal with the quest-
ion o:r Euro ean security and the differences bet een France 
and Ital .... 6 
The Conferenc a opened on Janua.r Zl, 1930, in the 
aller of the House of Lords b Ilia jesty the King, Gorge 
V, ose speech was ea.rd ove the wb.ol civilized orld. 
Tote delegates from the le ding po rs oft e worl~, he 
said: 
It is it sincere s tlsfaction that I am pr sent 
to welcome the delegates fro the leading po ers of the 
orld assembled with t e objGct of eliminating the evil 
results of steful competition in naval a.rmaments------
Since the great r all peoples have determin d 
that human statecra..ft shall. leave nothing undone to pre-
vent a repetition of that im and enae tra3edy-----
I earnes tl trust t t the r sttl ts of' the Confer-
ence will lead to an immediate al1ev1at1on of the heavy 
burden of armaments no weighing on the peoples of the 
orld, and also, by facilitating the work of the League 
Preparatory Co ssion on Diaar.mrunent , ha ten the time 
~ n a general disa ent conf'erence can de l with 
this problem in an even more comprehensive r . In 
illiam T. Stone , London r: aval Conf'erence, 104. 
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this hope I shall follow yo r deliberations w1 th the 
closest interest and attention . 7 
After the departure of the King, l1r . Stimson, delegate 
from the u. s. , then arose and nominated the Hon . R se 
cDonald, Prime Minister of Great Brit.a.in, as chairman of 
the conference . This motion was seconded by i:r . 
the French dele tion . 8 
In his speech accepti the .clutirmanship of the oonf er-
ence, R ey 1eDonald called attention to tho fact that the 
eyes of the orld ere upon the eeting they were setting 
" 
into operation. He pointed out· to ver def'inite things that 
the must consider in their proceedings . They were, first 
t t there was different need due to a.1~f'erent geographi-
cnl positions , orld responDibil1t1es, and points of ttack 
in event of r . A ton used in ships for one purpose was 
entirely a dii'f'erent thing fro a ton used in a ship !'or an-
other purpo e; and, second that anna.ment mtJ.Bt be discussed 
eparately:. 9 
The first day's se sion adjourn~d after delegations of 
each country voiced a he rty acceptance of the elco e given 
b Ria jesty th King . 
As Ramse cDonal d had pointed out ., the eyes of' the 
orld ere upon this Conference . The Now York World o:r 
~ 7Proceeci.plga of the London Naval Conference 1930., 
by the Dept.~f~ate, Conference Serles, 6~. 
after cited as London Naval Conf . ) 
33 8Ibid ., 28. 




that date said: 
The Washi ton Conference failed to apply to ships 
of 10,000 tons or less end because of this failure, thore 
has been, and is now in progress, competitive building 
of cruisers and submarines. The London Con.ference 111 
ve achieved its , 1n objective if it succeeds in ap-
pl ing the principal of 11m.1tation to all classes of 
slips. t natever agreement is reached t be internat-
1onaJ.l justified and internatio11B.lly agreed to.10 
This showed that the public was expecting the confer-
ence to act on the regulation of cruisers and s ubmarines , 
which were not included in tho ashington Treaty. 
Before the fur er proceedings of the Conference can be 
discussed, it is necessar to go briefly into t e d ands of 
each of the powers attending the sessions, because this Con-
f ere nee must concern 1 ts elf w1 th new constructions to be 
authorized for definite pe-rlod of r • 
Tho demands of the five powors ere as io~Lows: 
1 . The u. S. asked for par1t 1th Great Britain 
in all classes, and asked that large and small cruisers 
e counted as one class. According to the prevailing 
naval opinion., which was reluctantl modified 1n Set., 
1929, it wa.s,.desirable to·concentrate the whole Ameri-
can cruiser tonnage in 10,000 ton ships carr ei t 
inch guns. 
2. Groat Britain conceded parity in principal but 
asked that large a4 small cruisers be eonsidored as 
separate categories with pnrit 1n each . 
3. Japan asked for a r tio of seventy percent 1n 
big cruisers and for a ~er ratio 1n other categories . 
4. The British Empire , particularly Australia, 
and the United States insisted that Japan re in at sixty 
percent in big cruisers and desired that she re 1n at 
sixty percent in all other categories . 
5. The French position is a much ore difficult one 
to describe because not all the data are publicly avail-
able. Broadly speaking., one ma sa t tin .fi the 
claims the Frenc were subject to pressure from two dif~ 
10Editoria.l, 11 at Thoy Are Trying To Do At London", 
L1ternrz Digest, Jan. 25, 1930 . 
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ferent directions. The British and the Americans .were 
pushing down on them to reduce the level for construct-
ion of new cruisers and submarinea. The Italians were 
pushing up on t hem. There were three c.onf'lioting nat-
ional policies. The Britiah wanted the French to re-
duce their naval equipment so the Br1 tish could main-
tain as inexpensively as possible the Two-Power Stand-
ard, or at least decisive superiority as against the 
Continent . The Italians claimed parity with France, 
hlle France was determined to maintain superiority 
over Ital. The essential French claim was for a 
fleet equal to the Italian 1n the llediterranean, to 
the German in the Atlantic, plus a few ships in other 
ters . 11 
In the openi addresses made by the heads of the var-
1ous del.egations, nothing definite wa.a stated by an of them 
regarding their coimtriea' demands . Each one emphasized the 
fact that a true spirit of cooperation was necessary in order 
to accomplish the objectives set forth; nmn.ely, naval dis-
armaments in order to check competitive naval building of 
li t cruisers and submarlnea. 12 
In a press conference with Secretary Stimson on Jan. 
19, 1930, the following statement was released forte press: 
Answerin questions as to our attitude toward the 
desires of the French and Italians, Secretar Stimson 
ata ted that America is in the position of' a disinter-
ested friend . ve are anxious that their problems be 
sett led in a way sat1sfactor to all. Bot countries 
ha e agreed that the general object of this Conference 
is to take all classes of naval armaments out of the 
realm of competition and put the on a basis of a gree-
ment and thereby el1minato all possibilities 0£ suspi-
cion, r1 valry and irritation. Both countries have 
a greed that it is essential to accomplish this. They 
agreed .furthermore that each country in the Conference 
~ llwalter Lipp n, 'The London Naval Cont' . and AI:lerican 
View", Foreign Ai'fairs, VIII, 503-504. 
... 12tondon Naval Conference ~ ' 43- 59 . 
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satisfied and Ital and France will do 
can to promote such a resuJ.t .13 
The conference resumed ita meet1n0 on January 23, 1930, 
1n tho st . James Palace in London . Mr . cDonald presided. 
The etine; was called to order and the i'irat 01"'<ier of bus1-
ness a the selection of a vice-chairman and a secretary 
general . Tho nominations for the latter ere called for 
first. Sir au.rice Hankey of the .It ian dele tion aa 
nominated and unanimousl elected.14 
On the ques t!on of vice- chairman, 1 t ras agreed tb.a t 
the chair, in case of I.fr . cDona.ld' a absence, be filled by 
the head of each deleGation ta.ken in alphabetical order, 
uaing the English alphabet. 
It was then decided that for tho purpose of deali ~ w-lth 
the detailed work of the Conference , the whole Conference 
should be resolved into committees . That meant t t tho Con-
ference ould have to types of meetings: The original 
meetj_ng or the Conference, giving r1na1 effect to the de-
cision.3 of e co ttees. There was also to be a working 
comm.1 ttee of the conference dealing i th tho dotn.11 arr e-
ments of the Conforence .15 
Te French Governmen1.1 issued o. emorandum h1ch de-
cla.red that the French navy had been reduced by more than 
450 , 000 tons since 1914 . It also stated that the French 
Naval bud et was now 18,t belo 'I the pre-war budget . She 
l London a val. Conf . 1'330, 3 • 
- 15 ~~ ., 46. 
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said that no other po er bad made as great a reduction . 16 
The state of the French fleet on Jnn. 1, 1930, s 
publis ed int e London Times. It sho d a total of 681,808 
tons 1n. all classes of vessels . France's proposal waa that 
t J.e other po ers take the French na prog1 .. am as a basis 
for aJ.J. rebuilding pro rams bet een 1930 and 1936. Accord-
1 to the pro , Franco u1d have to build 240,000 tons 
or 40,000 annu.all. So stated further that she ould not 
reduce t s progr unloss the uarantees oi' securi t:y weJ?e 
reatly increased .17 
Ital objected to tb.1.s plan because there had not been 
a determine ratio and a maximum level of tonnage . This 
objection was recorded in the third plenar session of the 
Conference in n address by Si~or Grandi of the Italian 
dele tion, 1n which he said: 
I must however state that , ~le the Italian dele-
atron is prepared to take part in the disc ssions of the 
above points , it does not see its way clear to commit-
tino itself' on an of the q estions of method or on any 
special point of the disarmament problem until the two 
f'undanental questions, the determination of ratios and 
tho maximum levels of global tonnage have been settled . 
I am. full convinced t at only b - fa.cin0 aqua.rel 
the difficulties to hich I have called our attention 
can e hope to attain our purpose, hich is that of re-
ducin0 armaments to the lowest possible level .18 
This arning of Ital as dul recorded and the Con-
f erence proceeded th the question of methods of reductions . 
Italy nin recalled the importance of adjusting the question 
1 16stone, London Naval Conference, 104. 
l 7Ibid ., 104. 
lSLondon Naval ~ . ~ , 65 . 
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of ratios . In a speech b Mr . Gr nd.1, the Italian minis-
ter, before the plenary session, he emphasized the unfav-
orable eo ph1ca1 position of Italy, when he said: 
Let us now examine Italy's position 1n relation 
to the problem of naval defense To all intents and 
purposes, Ital is an island. deficient in some of the 
most essential ra materials; it is set in an inland 
sea. Al.though a Continental power----her scanty nat-
ural resources ake her dependent upon the sea-for 
us the sea is our lif'e. Italy has a great length of 
coast. The absolute needs for defense of her very ex-
istence would, therefore, fully justify insistence on 
relative superio1'i ty of strength, but 1n any case she 
has the right to expect that she will not be asked to 
deprive hersel f of her present right to naval arms.-
menta on a level with those of any other Continental 
European power. The Italian delegation hopes that 
the principal of one power standard ma be applied at 
the lowest possible level by Ital in her relation to 
continental European countries .19 
Thus it was clearl evident that Ital was demanding 
parity with France, while France was desirous of maintain-
ing superiorit in Continental naval strength. France was 
still olding out for ihat she termed her "Transactional 
Proposal11 at the Geneva Conf'erence . This subje,ct was dis-
cussed by ?fi> . Gibson, delegate from the U. S • ., in an address 
to the third plenary session. He said that it was most im-
portant that the conference get down to busines s in dis-
cuss methods of disarmaments. The problem of met od of 
1-1ml ta tion of naval armaments was first cons1der·eu i..is ). 
Preparatory Commission for the dlsarm.e.ment Conference at 
Geneva 1n 1926. The committee on methods at that Conference 
worked for some on tbs trying to rind a a le ideal method 
by which naval limitation could be ac ieved . The various 
:9:r6id • I 56 • 
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powers held divergent opinions as to what constituted an 
ideal method . Out of all this discussion and study gre· 
t o s-ehoo ls of thou t; th.at of limitation by categories 
and that of limits, an b total tonnage; Limitation by 
eate rios f'ixca the tonnage h1ch each country may use 
for ea.ch t:ype of vessel and therebJ fixes the total ton-
nage. Limitation b the global ethod .fixes th.e total 
tonnage for o eh navy and allo s each country to apport-
ion that tonnage as she sees fit among the various types 
of' slupa. 
In an endeavor to break the deadlock bet een these 
to schools o:f tho ht, • Paul Boncour, a member of the 
Fre ch delegation at Geneva,. brought f'orward a compro.mise 
proposal. It provided .for the alloco.tion of' total term.age 
.for the -navy of each nation,. the s e to be div ded int-o 
four categories, capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface 
vessels, and .submarine • The a.mount of' tonna e in each of' 
the above categories was to be decided b each country. 
However, an change which they might 1 to make s to 
be published to the ot er eontrncti po ers one year in 
advance. Briefly this as the French Transactional Pro-
posa.1.20 
The last plenary session that the origins. French de-
le3ation attended was held on Feb . 11, 1930, which met ex-
20Ib1d., 67-69. -
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prensl for the purpose of disc sing the status of tb 
subntarine . 
Th.is meeting was opened b y the Chairman Ramsey c-
Donald o.nd, after pl;'e11minary co tteo reports, be called 
for a statement from eac delegation regarding the position 
of' h irrespective countries on the submarine q estion • 
• A. v. Alexander, First Lord of the British Admir-
alty ., as the first to speak . He asked for the total abo-
lition of' submarines , basing his demands on these points : 
first, for the gener al interests o.f hum.a.nl t ; second, sub-
marines ro offensive, not defensive inatrmnent; third, 
abolition of sub arine craft ould be a substantial contri-
bu tion to orld disarmament and peace; fourt h ., a.boll tion of 
submarines uld provide a substantial financial relief to 
the nations; fifth, it would do away with the undue risks 
submarine service d e ds of its persoIUlel. 21 
• Stimson spoke :f'or the United States delegation . Ile 
too urged the abolition of submarines . His poeition was 
ba d not on an emotional appeal as was that of the British 
speaker., but was a practical and common- sense argument for 
destruc t ion or at least drastic limitation of this most ex-
pensive and most destructive of all types of modern naval 
equipment . 22 
Mr . Fenton of the Australian delegation and 1!r . Ralston 
21London e.va.J. Con:f . 1930, 81 . 
22J:b1d • ., 84 . 
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of tho Ca.badian delegation concurred 1th the Ffrst Lord 
of the Admiralty, ta.king a definite position for the abo-
lition of submarine craft. 
Th se reports uere followed by th.at of Mr . t . Le es 
of France . Ria posltio was as follo s: 
The submarine is warship, it is an indispen-
sablo weapon; the uso of submarines cui1 and should be 
regulated like tba t of any other warsl:µp . 
Ile stated further that the motion to abolish sumnarlnes 
wotild bring up these questions: f'irst, the lega1 rig.ht of 
any nation to possess any weapon derived from the process 
of science and technical ili'lProvementa; second, the right of 
' 
the lesser naval powers to possess a navy corresponding to 
t ir requirements for national defense; third, the ri, t 
of freedom of the sea.a . Uth these facts in view, .~ . Ley-
gues said that France would not accept the abolition of sub-
rines, but they were willi.ng and read to concur in an 
inter t: on.al a eement re ating the use of the underwater 
craft. IIe ended his remar with this motion: 
,A comm:I.ttee s ll be appointed to prepare an agree-
ment open.for s1gnatur'9 by all naval powers, forbidding 
submarines to act to:va.rd9 merchant ships otherwise tha!l 
in strict con:formity with the rules either present or 
future to be observed b surface wars ps . 23 
The Italian speaker, Grandi, stated that I·al~ was 
illin.g to concur th Franco in limiting the use of sub-
marines against Ilerchant ships, b ·t that she was al o wil- , 
ling to accept the total abolition of submarine warfare, 
23Ib1d., 88 . 
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should the other powers reach such an agreement . 24 
The representative of Japan, Admiral Takarhe, agreed 
with France, strongl maintaining that the submarine s 
essent1a1 to the safe rd1ng of Japan's island empire, 
but expressed willingne s to submit to regulations re-
garding size, number and use of submarine craft. 25 
After all the delegates had reported, the American 
delegation brought forward this resolution: 
That a co:mmittee shall be appointed to stud and 
report to the conference as to the possibility of agree-
ment on the .follow! questions: 
Folio 
( l) Aboli t1 on of submarines, 
(2) Re ulation of the use of submarines by sub-
jecting it to the rules of war governing the 
use of surface craft, 
(3) Regulation of the unit size of subms.rines . 26 
the acceptance of this resolution, the Conference 
adjourned for the day . 
The American delegation was hi y pleased w1 th the work 
of this session, a.s was s hown 1n t e romarks of Mr . Stimson 
at a press conference on this same date. • Stimson's words 
were to the effect that this agree nt regarding submarines 
was the first definite agreement to be reac ed by the Con-
ference . This alone, he said, was worth the visit of the 
American delegation to London, and the fact that the pro-
posal to limit the use of submnrines was made by the French 
delegation was the most hopeful omen yet to appear at the 
30 
Conf'erence . 27 
Senator De.vid A. Reed, a delegate at the Conference, 
voiced the same opinion 1n a radio address delivered on 
Feb. 16, 1930. Senator Reed said 1n part: 
e believe that this agreement is in itself an im-
portant accomplishment because we remember that it was 
the submarine cam.pal that brought America into the 
orld ar.28 
Thus ended the first phase of the Conference. During 
the absence of the French delegation, the American, Britis 
and Japanese continued informal discussions on matters con-
cerning only t ese nations and by rch 6th bad laid the 
framework of an agreement that it was hoped would be fitted 
into a five po er troaty. 
The main problem 1n the minds of the delegates was to 
find a aolutlon to the security question as advanced by · 
France. Before leavl the Conference , the French delegates 
had insisted that France ust be ranteed security before 
she would consider limiting her existing naval pro am of 
724,000 tons . To solve this problem, the idea of establishing 
some sort of Consultative pact to supplement the League or 
Nnt_ons and the ... ellogg Pact was ested and given £avor-
able consideration b some of the delegates . 29 
s us up to tho third phase of the Con:ference. 
aval Conference., Speeches .!EE! Press State-
·embers of the American Delegation, 23. 
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29New York Times., larch 10, 1930. 
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Follo "'the formation of the second Tardieu cabinet and 
with the return of the French delegation, with M. Briand 
as chairman., the Conference took up 1n earnes.t the work of 
propari a treat that would be acceptable to all five na.t-
ions and uld accomplish the avowed purpose of the Confer-
ence, the limitation of naval arnrunents and the furtherance 
of lorld Peace. 30 
rch there began a series of hi y important pol-
1t1cal conversations. • Driand conferred 1th r . Sti -
son nd, th cDonald, broadc st an &.ddress in hich 
he implied a British ref al to give further guarantees of 
litar security to France . f.ll'. McDonald declared 1n part: 
b 
e will not agree to any treat based on an en-
tangling military alliance . Such a treat would undo 
1n spirit and in policy the ork of the Conference. 
But we wilJ. try to secure as a part of the agreement 
a. pled e of good ill and pacific intention similar to 
that made by the President of the United States and 
m self af'ter bad convinced our3elves that an.a al 
a. re ent was posslble-----
Suc a pledge ought to a.llo programs to be re-
duced to a minimum if we have any confidence 1n each 
oth 's si tures.51 
e poaition a£ Great Britain was influenced no doubt 
e vie ot e erican delegation concerning the pro-
pose consul.tative pact . The American position on this sub-
jeot n not e publlc unt 1 re 11 hen, P.-t a tea, a 
elect roup of correspondents ere informed • Sti?:1-
son t t, as far as the U.S. wa.s concerned. , the possibility 
IJ-f? 30s.tone, London No.val Conf . , 106. 
31Ibid • ., 106. 
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of a consu1tat1ve pact bad been excl ded.32 
This attitude of the Americ delegates we.a due to 
the :fact that it was h1 y improbable that a treaty con-
ta1n1 any sue provisions could obtain the approval of 
two thirds of the U.S. Senate. 
In London w. St1.mson1 s declaration closed all .furthor 
discussion of the issue of French security and the Con.fer- . 
ence drifted rapidly toward a dangerous impasse. 
On the day followins the Stimson state nt, • Briand 
informed • lcDona.ld tha.t as far as he was concerned there 
as nothing more to be done in London .33 
On March 14th it became evident that Japan and the U. s. 
bad reac ed an agreement on their problems , so t he French 
delegates were faced with the prospect of being isolated by 
the three powers and blamed for the partial failure of the 
Conference. To avoid this, efforts ere me.de to keep the 
Conference alive, but no solution to the existing deadlock 
could be found. On rch 17th • Tar ieu returned to France, 
to be followed in a few da :s by Mr. Br1-~nd. 
Correspondents reporti the conference agrood that a 
crisis bad been reached and that only the injection of so e 
new element could keep it alive . This new element clll':le as 
a surprise to all interested. At midnight on Liarch 2th, 
r.Ir . St on mo.de a statement, as he said, clarif t e 
32London Naval Oonf'., Speeches and Press Statem nta, 
(London, l930~9. -
I 33Stone, London Na.val ~. , 107 • 
osition of the American dele a t1on. To ·many persons, 
this st tement seemed a reversal of his arch 11th state-
ment, alt ough l.l'. Stimson averred t t the attitude of 
his delegation ho.d not changed. He said, referring to the 
Marc llt state cnt: 
At t t time it was de clear that America had no 
objection to entering a consultative pact as such---
It will not# owever, nter into an t-reaty ere there 
is danger of its obligations being misunders tood as in-
volving a promise to render litary assistance- $ ch 
a misunderstanding might arise if the U. s . entered into 
a tre ty for the reduction of naval forces of another 
power . That danger bas hitherto inhered 1n t present 
sit tion 1ere ance has been demanding mil.i tary secur-
ity as a condition of naval reduction . If , however , 
this demand for security could be satis.fied 1n some oth-
er way, then the danger of a consultative pact would be 
eliminated and the question approached from a different 
standpoint . !rt such case , the American dale ation would 
consider the matter with an open mind.34 
The effect of the American statement was at once ap-
parent . ?.Ir. Briand returned at once to London and immediate 
efforts er made to find a solution of differences existing 
between France and Great Britain . France informed Great 
Britain that she would be satisfied with a formula clari-
fying t h e obligations of the states under Article XVI of the 
Lea e of Nations covenant. 3 
On April 8th an apparent solution 0£ the question was 
reached and • Briand reported t t France was ready to re-
duce its naval force from 724, 000 tons to G00,000 tons , pro-
... . . . 
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vlded the Italian claims ere thdra • As there seemed 




ediate solution of the differences of these two 
cDon ld announced t t the preparation of the 
ould o on and that Gre t Britain would endea or 
solution to the Italian- French problem and a 
three po er agreement would be made similar to that made 
by Great Britain., Japan and the United States . 
The Conference et for the last time on April 22, when 
the delegates asse bled to si the treaty as dr · wn up b 
the Com:tittees . This treaty 111 be discussed at le th in 
the next chapter. 
The rk of the Conference can best be summed up in the 
words of Cha.iI"l!l.aD. R sey cDonald hen he said: 
The Conference has done a great rk. We ve se-
cured a three power agree ent on building programs., w ch 
in itself' is no mean or unimportant achievement . This., 
with other points embodied in the treaty., has repeatedly 
defied solution and has brought conference to naught . On 
the apparently simple lll!l.tter of settling the method by 
which the relative strengths or navies may be a reed, 
hitherto there have been unsurmountable dif~erencea of 
opinion .. 
These have gone . We ve stopped the replacement of 
battleships and reduced t heir numbers. We have limited 
the tonnage of auxiliary craft. 9 e ve shown how the 
equipment., the building, and the replacement of fleets 
can be brought within the realm of international order . 
e have proved how., when the world so desires., the menace 
of arms can be removed by treaties regulating t eir de-
velopment. 
True, the work a yet has been but partially achieved. 
But 11 reat adv nces in international relationships must 
be done 1n stages, and e have ono oh further than has 
hitherto been possible . 36 
36tondon Naval Conference~' 103-104. 
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So ended the plenar sessions of the Conference when 
the delegates met to sign the Lon on Naval Treaty as drafted 
b the Coil'l!llittees. This meeting took place on April 22 . 
CIIAPTER III 
TEE LONDON HAVAL TREATY 
It was indeed a solemn occasion en the twen t-y-
eight delegates of the five reat naval powers of the 
world met in st. James Palace on April 22, 1930, and s1 
ed the London N val Treaty of 1930. This treaty, the pro-
duct of the London Maval Conference, went further than any 
other agree nt ever heretofore made between the leading 
nations of the world. For three months these men had labored 
with vast and at times seemi ly 1ns,oluble problems before 
them. • Stimson, chairman of the American delegation, 
expressed the feelings of the Conference when he said: 
e feel that we have accomplished a lo step on 
this road to peace . D t s treaty, competition will 
b co:t:IPletely ended bet een the navies of the three 
eatest naval po ers of the orld--America, Br_tain, / 
and Japan: and with the other two powers-France and 
It ly-we have also reached agree ents which though not 
complete are leading 1n the same direction. Eventually 
o confidently hope co otition 11 be abolished among 
all five powers.l 
The main provisions of this treaty were as follows: 
1. The Capital ship holiday was extended till 1936. This 
meant that the rive powers agreed not to construct the battle-
ships authorized for replace ent under the provisions of the 
ashington Treaty . 
aval Conf'., Speeches and Press Statements b 
---- of theAmerican Delegat!on, Conf. Series · o . 
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2. Ar efinition of aircraft carriers was made to include 
ships und r 10 , 000 tons. 
3. A limi ta. tion ree nt was de under which the same three 
po era established tonnage levels for cruisers, destroyers 
sub rines beyond hich they agreed not to bu1ld before 
Dec . :31, 1936 . 
4 . A safeguardi:qg agreement was reached, by hlch each of the 
three powers s given the right to exceed the tonnage levels 
established for cruisers , submarines and destroyers, if 1n its 
opin1on ne construction by powers not included in the treaty 
end ered its national securlt . 
5 . A humanitarian clause s inserted in the treaty, by which 
the fiv pow rs agreed to apply to submarines the same rules 
o international la 
to merchant ships . 
A series of re 
hich govern surface vessels in relation 
ator agreements ere included under 
1ch the five po ers established rules for replacement , scrap-
p and conversion of arships . 2 
There ere, o course, other provisions in the treat , 
but thos outlined bove ere t e oat vital and the ones with 
·ch re shall be concerned in this chapter. 
Und r Article I of the treaty, the contract!~ parties 
agreed to build none battleships berore 1936; in another 
they suspended the aahington reat and made no provision for 
2stone, London Naval Coni'erence, 111 . 
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capital ship buildi in the immediate future . France and 
Ital were allowed replace nt tonnage to the amount of 
70,000 tons each. Tb.is as the amount of' tonna e to hich 
thy ere entitled to construct under the Was ton Treaty 
between the years of 1927-29. Since they had not made this 
construction pr· or to 1930, the were allo ed to proceed 
with this amount of construction . 3 
In addition to curtailing the replacei:rent of' c pital 
ship, Great Britain, Japan and the United Stataa agreed to 
crap nine battleships i thin thirty months after the treaty 
ent into force. Of this number, Great Britain was to des-
troy four ship and retain another as a training ship after 
it had been rendered unfit for combat service . The U. s . 
a eed to dispone of two a ps, retaining a third for train-
p oses . Japan as to render one ship unf'it for combat 
purposes nnd use her own discretion as to the advisabilit of 
destroying it or using it as a traini sh1p.4 
'llms by 1936 tho tbreo fleets ould be as follows: 
Great Britain--15 ahips "th a tonnage of 474 , 750 tonsj 
United St tes--15 ships with a tonnage of 462,400 tonsj 
Ja an---------- 9 shi s 1th a tonnage of 266 ,070 tons.5 
nder the provisions o t e Washington treaty, aircraft 
51 3London Naval Conf., D~est of London Naval Treaty, Pub . 
by Dept . of State , Co • series o . 4, 1. (Hereafter 
cited as Digest of London Naval Treaty.) 
4Ib1d ., 1. 
I 5Ibid ., 12. 
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carrier levels were fixed at 135, 000 tons for Great Brit-
ain and the same ount £or the United States, hile Japan 
s to have 81 , 000 ton and Ital y and France iere to have 
60, 000 tons e ch . T ese levels ere not changed b t e 
London treaty, but definition of an aircraft carrier was 
amended to incl vessels under 10 , 0 O tons s ed for tiLis 
purpose and it was stipulated that such ves s el s must not be 
th eator than six inch guns . 6 
~he shin on and Genova Conferences faile to place 
an llmitation on auxiliary vessels , but the London Confer-
enc succeeded so e hat better than its predecessors in that 
res ct . A three-po er a reemcnt regulating these categories 
s made by l"ea t Br1. t in , Japan and the United Sta tea . This 
a eement established the maxjmurn tonnage levels hich mi t 
bo re~ched b 1936, in the cate ories of cruisers , destroyers 
and u rines . Tho levels iere aa follo s : 
Cater.;or:y 
Cr er 
Dest o ers 
s rines 
ff e SC pe'1 
Article 1 camo to 
arts of the ole 
rea.c Article 
4, 6Ib1d • ., 12. 
7Ibid., 12 . 
~ - G. B. 
l , 000 146 , 000 
145, 500 192, 200 
150, 000 150, 000 
52,700 52, 000 
or "Loop ole" clause of the 
be kno , as one of the 
tre t bees. se its effects 
21 provides that: 
Japan 
J 0 
105 '" 000· 
52 , 007 
treat :, as 
ost inter ting 
re so far 
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I.f duri the te of the present treat the re-
quire ents of national secur1t of an of the contract-
ing parties are in the opinion oft t party affected 
b new constructions of any power other than t..l·10s 1tho 
joined in part three of tltls treat, that part will 
notify the other contracting parties as to tho increased 
requirements of their o tonnage----------------8 
In effect, this clue ant that the 11 tation 1m-
posed on the United States, Great Britain and Japan b Part 
III of the treaty could be exceeded on notice of any one 
of these powers . The other powers ere t n to make pro-
portional increases in their own tonnage . The extent to 
which this article impairs the v lue of the other ital 
parts of the treat s a matter of much scussion. 
An American delegate, Senator Joseph T. Robinson, said 
in commenting upon this pha e of the treaty: 
Of cours, it ma be said in criticism that this 
clause permits a di turbance of the fi ea eed to 
on the sole responsibility of either ta United St tes 
or Great rito.in or J ap; and if an one of the t_ ee 
ajudges it to be necessary to build in exce s of the 
treat pro ram, this will increase e build! r, of the 
other two . But even should this happen, the relation 
of the .fleets and the principle o.f limitation ould 
still be maintained It should lso be re embered th.at 
the 11m1 ta.tion of a ents st proceed only tb.ro 
the voluntary action of' nations and tho. t no po er can 
impose on another restrictions of the eans of defense 
without assuming respo sibili t for its safety. It is 
of first im~ort ce that he l · tation of arm ents 
shall be re..:,arded as increasing rather than diminishing 
the safety of peoples , and if emergencies arise threaten-
. i ediate d aer , a people sho d be free o respond 
to the require~ents of their situation. Othorvdse the 
fate of nations must forever be botmd. up w1 th t e main-
tenance of large armaments and the imminence of nr. It 
leaves the responsibillt of determi the require-
8London aval Treaty of~, Pub . by Dept . or · State, 
Coni' . Serles No . 2, 15. 
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nts for national soc1rity \"!here it belongs , namely, 
on the re pective nations . Thi s clause i s based upon 
the ood faith oft t e nations and it is incon-
ceivable that it will be ed except pon necesait~. 9 
There ere those o felt t t this cl ause virtuall 
did all the good acco .lished b the rest of the treaty. 
those this vie as John B. w tton, in writ-
in the t Hi tory gazine of' June, 1950 . 
e agre ent concerning submarine warfare 
has bo n di c sed at so.. e length in Chapter II of this 
thesis. 1:his provision occ rred 1n Article 22 of the treaty 
DJ.1d dif'f' red f'rom ·· e o er parts of the a reoment in that , 
le they ere to be in orce only till 19 6 , this parti-
cu1 r elauso s to be in effect for all time to come . 
s iven by 
ens.tor avid • Re in a radio address to the · ted States, 
del~vered fro London on the day the treatJ was sizned . • 
Re said, in s n up the treat and the work of the Con-
ference n general: 
t then has been accomplished? To begin w1tht 
have all reed to leep our present battles 1 s, 
"c' are erfectly. sea rthy and effective , and to 
take a holi in ne b ttles p construction to Jan . 
1~ 1937 . In that one stro~e o ve saved an outl ay 
b t~e United States of about 400 , 000, 000. When e 
think of the numbor 0£ miles or 1 proved roads , or 
the nur:ib r of br1d es, or the nur.a er o.f public b·iil -
ing that can b bad for tba t sum of m.oney, I for one 
convinced t at ci liza tion is the c,;ainor uy tL.ls 
Then inc 1 era , altho "hour prosent 
floats are t:i. u11....- 11 co ared wit 1 t_1e c:rtl.seir 
fleets of Japan and Gr at ritain, our building po er 
n on • v 1 Conference , Speeches and Pr ess Statements 
> ers .Qf the American Dele13a t!on, 50 . 
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s been reco,nized and reat Britain bns readily 
a reed to parity, and Japan s a reed to a antis-
factory relatio hip bet1oen t e fleets, with tho 
res t that, 1le o build at a moderate speed d r-
ing these seven ear, tie British and Japanese fleets 
are either reduced or 111 remain at about today' 
1 vel. To the ~reat relief o! the taxpayers of all 
three countries, th same is true o! destro rs . e 
will crap some or our ar 1.me vessels, Great Drita1n 
scraps so e and Japan scraps so e; and the resultant 
flee a, icL 111 be lar c nough for eac of us and 
£or all no l police rk that such vessels are called 
pon to conduct, ill nevertheless represent parity with 
Great Britain and a satisfactory relationship w1 Ja-
pan . Ins hmarines, our problem as been different, be-
cau e, h1lo e are encou~nre bv the a eernent of the 
.five po ers to use the s rines in a humane ay, never-
t.eless th temptation to sink merchant ships it out 
ming is very great , and we felt that the world ould 
be better insured a nst sue a murderous submarine 
cam al as occurred in the last orld war ii' the ab-
rine ns an instrument of' warfare ere alto ether abol-
ished. So e of the other nations were not rea.d;y to go 
so far, ho ever, and the best re could do was to a ee 
to a parity 1 such vessels at a lo figure between Great 
rltain, Japan and ourselves, a .:C'1(J e that requires the 
de truction of a n1 ber of these vessels 1n th British 
fl t, o.nd tot t extent re ves the menace that results 
froJ the existence o these rattlesnakes of the sea . I ~ 
l ve not 1..llldertaken to burden you with a lot of st t1st1cs 
on tonna e, but have tried to ive you in outline the 
substance of the trea.ty that has been o.de. '11he benefits 
to all concerned are v ry obvious.10 
ne treaty · s h iled in t e variou countries aa a 
great stride .fa rd 1n h relationships and international 
• '.Ille Japan so rime st r on Oct. 27, 1930, 
s .id 1n p J: t in radio address to hi nation: 
Th treat of Lo don s opened a ne ch pto in 
t e !story of n civilization. le have once for all 
escape fro at I c-11 the pioneer stage , 1n ich 
every nationta dis actuallJ or potentially a~ainst 
ever ot er. ~1e ll.av e tered on tl e sane and friendl 
tr ottlement" sta. e 1n which everyone is united to sup-
pross ntrusio ab an o on another's sphere . A mom-
entou step form.rd on the road of international peace 
(, lOibid . , 61-62 . 
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and fr1end~b1p has now been talce . Let it rove pre-
lude to st111 eater tr1 phs fort t lofty cause .11 
President Hoover , on this same date, 1n his dd.ress re-
latin to the s1 ing of the treaty, said: 
Te se sions of the five po ere at London have served 
to stre t on mutual trust and con.fldence am.on.; t em, and 
they give me seurance t t the hopes of the world 111 
not be disappointed .12 
le tho Britisl Prime tor, aloo on the s e date , 
sa t e prelude to his ad'ress: 
It is th erfect satisraction tat I no add fro 
London a few ord.o to those alread spoken by remier 
c in Tokyo and Pres . Hoover in ~as ngton on this 
very ondorful occasion-----The fr1ondl relationship 
and ollaboration bet eon our countries hicl is diroct-
l y attributable to thio treat should be a groat source 
0£ ncourag ent to those endeavoring to reach agree-
ent among t emselve and o..fterwarda with us.1"3 
The final ratification of the London N val Treaty a 
p oclaime by P osident Ho er Jan. l, 1931, and eac~ of the 
five nat~ons involved turned to the et task of puttin into 
ffect th te ch it devoutly 1oped would make ror 
peace an safet of the entire orld of nat ons . 
Id., 3 O. 
12Ibid., 301 
13Ihid . , 301. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE END OF NAVAL LDUTATIONS 
While tho great powers of t he world wer e much enthused 
over the work accomplished by the London Conf'e~ence of 1930, 
this hopeful attitude was not to be long lived . 
The bates and suspicions engendered by the World War 
were still s o active that anything like a sympathetic under-
standing between nations was impossible . The ever present 
fear of agreasion and the uneasy consciousness of 1lllpending 
danger 1.mpelXed each nation to take such steps as would p lace 
t 
it in a position of security among its neighbors , whose pro-
mises of friendship were not to be taken seriousl y so l ong as 
there was an inequality i n armed equipment and this inequality, 
in the m1nd of each participant, could only be met by the su-
periority of its own defense. 
As previousl y stated in Chapters II and III, France and 
Italy would not come to any agreement during the London Con-
ference. Italy demanded parity with France and France would 
not consent to such an agreement , but instead demanded parity 
with Italy 1n the Mediterranean, parity with Germany in the 
Atlantic and various other items of armament in excess of 
theso two powers ., Germany and Ita l y . To bring the London Con-
ference to a closo and to facilitate the actual treaty- making, 
Great Britain proposed the three power agreement between Ja-
pan, United States and herself, allowing France and Italy to 
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accept such parts of the resulting tre ty as they saw fit . 
In addition, Great Britain offered to act as mediator be-
tween France and Italy and to endeavor to form. a three pow-
er European agree ent bet een them and herself similar to 
the three power a re ement bet een the United States, ~apan 
and Great Britain. l 
To this end, a number of proposals and counter-pro-
posals for the solution of the France-Italian controvers 
were involved during the final weeks or the Lon on Conf'e~-
ence , but, when the Conference adjourned, the two powers 
were almost as far apart as they had been at the beginning 
of the session, three onths before. 
SUbaequent effor s to reach an a ee ent w~re not en-
cour ging . On April 30 , 1930, Italy d published its naval 
program for the coming year, which provided for the construct-
tion of 42 , 900 tons , match1.ng the French pro am ton for ton. 2 
On May 12, 1930, ssolini had d livered the first of 
a series of provocative speeches , declaring that: 
There is something inescapable , inevitable, in the 
march toward destiny of Fascist Italy----Nobody can hal t 
lt . ------ rords are very :fine things , but nmskets , chine 
6 s, ships , airplanes and cannon are still finer things; 
the are finer because right , 1£ unaecompanied by 1!11ght, 
is an e ty ord .3 
The announcement of Italy1 s naval pro am and thos re-
ir1111am T. Stone, "The Franco- Italian aval Dispute', 
Foreign olicy Reports, III, 152 . 
2Ib1d . , 152 . 
3ne York Times , ay 18, 1930 . 
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marks of I1 Duce created much concern 1n France and so, 
when Foreign Minister Grandi ma.de an effort to arrange, with 
the help of the League , a compromise at Geneva on May 12, 1930, 
France was in such a suspicious frame 0£ mind that no progress 
could be made . 
On June 3, 1930 , Mr . Grandi announced that Italy was wil-
ling to suspend its pro6ram. of new construction, pending the 
course of negotiations , provided that France did likewise. 
France refused this offer and Franco-Italian relations seemed 
to have again reached an impasse. 
On July 7, 1930, however, Mr. Briand announced that he 
had officiallJ informed Mussolini of France ' s readiness to 
suspend construction of new ships until Dec. 1, 1930, in or-
der to permit a renewal of negotiations between the two coun-
tries. Aru.ssol1n1 accepted the proposed holiday; however, 
reaching a de£in1te accord was a more dirficult matter . Ne-
gotiations began in Paris in August 1930, with Mr . Massigli, 
or the Foreign Office, representing France, and Sr. Rosso 
representing Italy, w-lth Mr . Alexander., First Lord of the Ad-
miralty, representing t he British interests and endeavoring 
to act as an 1lnpart1a1 broker between the two disputing par-
ties . No solution had been reached by October 1930, when 
Ambassador Hugh S. Gibson from the United States also tried 
to act as intermediary; his efforta, like those of tlr . Alex-
ander, were of no avail . When the naval holiday expired 
Dec . 1, 1930, no agreement had been reached . 
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In Februar; 1931, Great Britain again sent the Brit-
ish Foreign Secretar, Arthur Henderson, to Paris for the 
purpose of arranging a comproniise . The r or tat had al-
armed Great Britain was the report that the French larine 
.inistr was preparing a naval progr for 1931- 1932 which 
wold include a new 23 , 000 ton "pocket battleship", to off-
sett e Gernm.n ship, "Deutschland", on ch work as rap-
idl proceeding . 
The British Foreign O~fice foresaw thnt once France 
proceeded with the construction of a ne type of battleship 
before reach1Il8 an accord cceptable to Ital and Great 
Britain, tl a 
race. 4 
uld inevitabl lead to a renewed a ents 
The 1onth of Februar 1931 was a bus one for • Hen-
derson and 1;,r . Alexa er. Du.1~1 this nth the - de sev-
ernl trips to both Paris and Rae and on arch 1, 1931, it 
was aimounced the. t a basis f'or 
Italy had been reached . 5 
reement between France and 
The text of this a roement, hich subsequentl y proved 
so illusory, act lly embodied onl t e Bases of A re ent 
and contained no details of build The definite 
a ,,..reement was to be drafted b· naval: experts of the tbre 
po ers before final ratification . To the la~ n, the Bases 
of A eement ere so abstr ct and the phrasing so obsc e as 
4Iew York Tim.es, Feb . 13, 1931. 
!!!! ~ Times, J!arch 2, 1931. 
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to be woll-n1 
The th1~e 
un1ntell10 1ble . 6 
in provisions of the agree nt were, first, 
a.nee 
b1lizat1on oft e rench and Italian fleet-sJ second, 
s to have a1periorit over Italy in battleship and 
ub rines, as 11 as tn older c iaera , hile, in new con-
struction to be COlDPleted, the tonnage of tho two po era 
s to be eq l; third, nope 
for Italy, France and Great 
ent ratio was to be set up 
itain, t tis, like tho 
5:5:3 ratio provided b the London Treaty for the United 
States, Jap nd -reat Britain. 7 
1 e break o of this agreement ca.me hen France dis-
a ree t Ital and Gre t Britain on the replacement of 
over-aged equipment, and, follo this breakdown, further 
ne otiations see e useless . 
In the face oft es conditions, another conf'erence was 
called b the League of Nations . In December 1925, the 
Leagu,e d created a reparatory D1sa ent Conmrl.ssion for 
t..~e urpose of preparing for a General Disar.rna nt Conference . 
It s ~ina.ll arranged to hold sue a conference in 1932, 
and on 23, 1931, the League Council unanimously seleeted 
Arthur llenderaon, then Socretar or Forei . Affairs in Prime 
nister Ra.mse c nald's second Labor n1stry, for pres1-
dent oft e Gonoral Conf'erence . oneva was selected s the 
meeting place and Februar 2, 1932, as the date for the op-
6stone , anco- Italian naval Dispute , 154. 
7Ib1d., 154. 
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ening a ssion. 8 
The Conference was disrupted b Germany's resi tion 
f'rom the League and announce ent tha Germany a arming 
for any e ergenc that t arise. To prevent the complete 
disruption of all disarmament 11Jnit tions, Great Britain 
brought out the "Draf't Convention Plan" . This plan would 
not alter the arrange ent betgeen the parties of the Wash-
ington and London Treaties . France again refused to accept 
thes terms, basing her refusals on the ounds that Great 
Br1ta1n, the United States and Japan were free to lay down 
new ships for replacement each year between 1933-36, wh1.1e 
France would be limited to a program desiB1ULted for a ~ingle 
year . 
Under Clause 21 o~ the London Treat, Great Britain had 
the right to increase its destroyer tonnage , if Italy and 
France should increase their tonnage in the "pocket battle-
ahipu class so as to endanger Great Britain's naval security. 
This danger Se ed imminent at this time and, if Great Bri-
tain should exercise the rights given her under Clause 21 of 
the London Treaty, the whole question of naval limitation be-
een the United States, apan and Great Britain would be 
reopened . 
Ambassador Soto of Japan dropped a bombshell into the 
Conference when he declared that Japan regarded the London 
and ias ngton Treaties as unstable in character and wa ed 
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t this country would expect hi.gher r tios at the next 
naval conferenc in 1935.9 
~ period rro October 1931 to April 1934 was dark-
ened o r ·he cons t and ever gro threat of a no 
nited St ta.and Japan de barked on the largest ship 
uildi s since the 1orld ar . The United Statos 
ct t e Vinson Bill, desi ed to bring the United States 
l av up to t OJ. the London and Washington 
treaties . This bill carried authorization for the construct-
ion of 102 veasels of v rious cate cries, at an estimated 
10 cost of from 475,0 ,ooo to 1,000,000,000. 
Jap , too, had launched a "replenishment program", de-
si ed to bring their nav up to the .mrudmum tonnage levels 
on the xp1rat1on of the existing a reements . France and 
Italy were competing in the editerranean, while Great Br1-
tain as strivinz to maintain her relative position in Eur-
ope as ell as overseaa .ll 
This co etit1on within the .framework of the naval 11.mi-
ta.tion treaties was due 1n lar e measure to the efforts of 
t; leading po ers to place the selves in the best possible 
9 1111am T. Ston, "Disarmament Cria1s 11 , Foreign Policy 
Renorts, IX, 193, 
lOibid. , 194. 
11 .1111am T. Stone, "Impend Na.val Rivalry'', Foreign 
Policy Reports, X, 30. 
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bargaining position at the next naval conf'erence . With 
the then existing treaties about to expire, Japan, France 
and Italy were striving to improve t heir pos itions , while 
the United States and Great Britain were seeking to pre-
serve the ex1.st1ng ratios by building to the maximum level 
permitted by the Washington and London agreements . 
By the !~partial observer it must be admitted that , 
according to th~ then existing agreements, the United States 
and Great Britain enjoyed distinct advantage as individual 
units and that, taken together, a coalition that any Euro-
pean crisis might easily produce wou.ld prove vastl y superior 
to any Et.1.ropcan or Asiatic a l ignment . 
Under the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, the 
five principal maritime powers were to meet in 1935 to re-
view the status of the existing treatiea. Unless a new 
agreement was reached, the London and Washington tr~aties 
would expire on December 31, 1936 . Japan had already an-
nounced its intention to ask for a higher ratio . France 
and Italy had come to no definite acreement so that, al-
though the London and Washincton treaties had mor e than two 
years yet to run, the i\1t1.1~e relationship of the leading sea 
powers was being shaped by events which would predestine the 
1935 Conf'erence to failure even before 1t could meet . The 
outlook for naval limitation was indeed dark . Conf'idence in 
international agreements and the efricacy of peace machinery 
had been shaken by the collapse of the Disarmament Confer-
ence at Geneva , the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the 
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Lea e of Nations and the inability of the League to en-
force its verdict in the coni'l cts in the _a.r East and in 
South! er ca.12 The Pac f c settlement re ched at the 
·as Conf'orence had been virtuaJ.l~ null1f ed y Ja-
pan's nvasion d contin ed domination of 
Ot~er sic;na pointed unmistakably tote end of all 
armament 11.I!li ation. On Dece ber 29, 1934, Japan formnll 
denounced the iashington Treat • On !arch 13, 935, Hitler 
procla. .ed Ge ny's freedom to rea , and it s revealed 
tat the German avy had alre d~ been strengthened ithout 
regard for the provisions oft e Versailles Treaty.14 
nien the R@ich's construction \"18.s given British sanc-
tion n ~e An.glo-G rman naval pact of June 18, 1935, France 
declarod herself to be reamning f ,1 libert of act:on 1n the 
f eld of naval rea ent .15 
On Jul~ 22, 1935, Great Britain, tak advantage of 
Clause 21 oft e London Treaty ., declared erseli' to have 
abandoned the ratios set u b the treaty. 16 
In re , the President of the United States declared, 
on September 27, 1935, that t e United States would aintain 
1n1der 1 c rc,un.stances the rat o of strengt provided by 
the treaties, which of course meant increased naval construct-
12Ibid. , 32. 
13Ibid . , 32 • 
14----;Id H. Popper, " of Naval Disarmament", Foreie;n 
Policy Reports, XI, 202. 
15Ibid . , 202. 
l6Ibid . , 203. 
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ion to ~:eep the United States l'Iav in 1 ts former ratios 
_t_ Japan and Great Brlta1n . 17 
us es e that t . e nations, one by one, ~o !vated by 
sn ..s .. icion, jealousy and a f'eelin3 of in.seq~ ity, re , sed to 
e ounc1. b,cr treaty on conf renoe a,.,. eementa. T s was no 
doubt partly attributable to the inabilltu 0£ the Lea e of 
1ationa to enf'orce or even direct the policies sat forth by 
the treaties or aireements already adopted . 
Previous to the events just 01tlined, Groat Britain d 
de in 1934 and 1935 several serious atte pts to find a 
basis £or agreement for a Je Treaty to be ma.de 1n 1935 , to 
tako the place of the London 1930 treaty, ~hich was to ex-
pire at Jhe end of 1936 . These attempts ere th arted at 
ever turn; Japan ref sed to consider an~ treat- ,nless the 
rat o • rinciple was abandoned and e stabllshment o.f a "Com-
mon Upper Limit" for the Powers as s1b.stituted . Too , Ja-
pan insisted en parity in lobal tonna~e, hich uld allow 
eacl nation to allot the tonnage in each category as it sa• 
fit. 
Te emands made by Japan included a oe..-ere reduction 
in large battles ips and rplane carr.lers . Should t eae 
proposals have been accepted. Japan woul.d have indeed been 
mistress of the Pacific, but o~ course such red ctions ere 
at cross- p rposes w1 the plans of the United States . 18 
17Ne~ York Times , Sept . 28, 1935. 
18Editoria.1. "The naval Conference", Current History, 
XLIII, 5017- 509 . 
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Several other proposals ere made, butt ey likewise 
met failure. 
lked in its attempt to prepare for a naval Conference , 
Great ritain app rently bandoned hope for anything but a 
eshift aQree ent . 
The at osphere of crises had become chronic in Europe 
and the Far East and precluded an serio s effort to curb 
the arne.ment race . The rld instead s confronted with 
the possibility oft o forms of naval co petition: quanti-
tative and qualitative.19 
B quantitative co ~ etition, the tonna e of eac navy 
ould be increaaed- -each trying for domination in the field 
of capaclty--the qualitative provided for production of new 
t:ypea of fi ting craft desi ed to meet the special and 
eo apbical needs of ach 1ndivid al nation . 
For example, w le the United States felt the need of 
lar e battleships and airplane carriers for protection of 
the Philippines, Japan de ed sub ines and pocket bat-
tlesh1ps for use 1n her Island Kingdom. 
In spite 0£ the apparent uselessness oft e effort, the 
London Conference et 1n Dece ber, 1935, and, after discus-
sions oh the s east e prel1.minar conversations, drew up 
a treaty which was ai ed arch 25, 1936. This treat y 
be summed up in the ords o:f Helen Fis or in the Foreign 
Polio Reports o:f October 1 , 1936. She said, in speaking 
l9popper, The End o:f Naval Disarmament, 211. 
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or the ratification of the 1936 Treat b the United States: 
y s tore--- reed o its r t1f1oat on w1 
opposition, beoa • t e 
1 a o ort t 
e ~bove statement was borne out by the Congressional 
Record of the Senate for fa.7 18, 1936. 
Sot e first and greatest collective experiment in dis-
arm ents succumbed to the .forces that lead to war . The ut-
tar £utility of the effort of the nations, through their 
state n and diplomats, to build up ,vorld aeo'll:t'ity and 1m-
ty to r thratle;h the reduction of armaments can be t-
tributed to the age long enmity or races and the ambition of 
power-loving leader& brou- t into be1 by the breakdown ·of 
t e r l of peopl sufferi from the devastations of the 
orld ar. Ge t under ta humiliation of the 
ers lloa Treaty, ting th implacable fury the nations 
that bad aootr1buted to her defeat, as ripe for a Hitler. 
Italy, fluahed with the aucc ss of the allied armies and 
je lou of Franc overt e division of the Ge--r.man colonies, 
and fea , as read for a. a sol-
1n1 t s promises of a restored Roman Empire and his 
dre of orld Peace thro fo1~e. The eakness o:f the 
Versailles Treaty noemed a justification of this t eory of 
t sol tion of orld conflict. 
France, re er old nm1t1es and fear Italian 
domination or agression, was skeptical of any 
BOHelen Fisher, Future a.val L1m1tat1ons", Foreisp. 
ol1cy Report, XII, 178. 
a,.~nts or advnnaoo on tho ~ of Itn.ly. 
:~. nth her vision ot oxpa.naion_ bad DO m11xi to 
ncoept an· c-J.rtailmont 1n ~ neceQsary to gtt1n her 
obJectivee. aril, 'flhlle connil: ac.ceptJ.nc certain provis-
i.an.s dei"~ b y Engl,:D.oo a.nd th& Um.too Stntea, evld~ly 
did no nth hov f!ngero crossed. 
Great Dl'1ta1n, t'eellns seenre 1n bar poo1t1on as m.s-
tro:Js of the Seas and hoanenocl by her .1noroobin8 .fr1ondsh1p 
'With tho Uni tod 3ta:tos, oou1d soo no retwon m., the r>9000 
ot the uorld eotild not be m.1nt<:Uned• e8'90ciall.o1 al:nce these 
tuo groat powor:: wore wlllln3 to r.ied!.uto atld cbm:;,1on the 
ca.use of rcduet1on or amr:u::ionta and the fl tab1Uza t1on of 
Europe. 
Tho Unit$d States, bAvtng. b3 1ts part1o1pnt1on 1n 
tho World \'Jar, 11.bandonod the pollc ~ 100J.at1on. ma eagor 
to lend o. baD1 in tho reconstruction or European pol1clos 
Oolld tho fuJ.tillmont ot tho droams tJt ~oodrow \71l.Bon- £or a 
.ta.tr and just sllgnmont ~ I?uropoan Power. 'l1hu.s crosa par- v'" 
poaos., cross CUZTellto., smb1t1on ntld. intP.lguo brc,uzt1t to 
J.lt.lUObt tho droo::l Of o. world .freed by the reduction ot ni--
mmncnte 1"ram tl"~ t'Jl)3lQce 0£ qar. 
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SUMUARY 
As stated in the foreword of this thesis, an effort 
bas been made to give a complete and yet concise picture of 
the London Naval Con.ferenee , its background, the resulting 
treaty and the consequence of this con:ferenae and the treaty. 
In Chapter I an effort was made to give the political 
background for the conference by tracing the development of 
disarmament movement from the Versailles treat y, through the 
Washington Conference , to the assembling of the Conference 
in London in February, 1930 . 
Chapter II deals with the actual working of the Con-
feren~e f r om its organization with Ramsey McDonald as chair-
man, through its three phases, to the signing of the Treaty 
on April 22 , 1930. No account of the workings of the var-
ious conmdttees of the conference could be given since the 
records of these committees and their work are not available . 
The work of the six plenary sessions was given in some de-
tail to show the difficulties that had to be surmounted be-
fore the treaty could be framed and adopted . In this chap-
ter we found France and Italy to be recal citrant and to con-
clude the Conference which had run on for three months ~ 
Great Britain proposed the three power agreement to be sign-
ed by the United States, Japan and herself . Great Britain 
then proposed to act as media.tor between France and Italy 
and to endeavor to f'orm some sort of agreement with these 
powers , similar to the Japanese , United States and Great 
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Britain limitation ao;reenent. 
Chapter III deals with the treaty itself, setting forth 
its main features and discussing them at some length. In 
the concluding chapter, the naval disarmrunent movement is 
tracod from the ratification o~ the treaty through tre vari-
ous steps of disentegration to tho expiration of the treaty 
in 1936 . Through all this the ever growing jealousy and dis-
trust bet\11een France and Italy is sh.o,m and the 1mw1111ngness 
of these nations to cor,promise or agree on any form of limi-
tation. 
'!he author feels that his contribution lios in the fact 
that in this thesis the complete working of the Co:nf'erence, 
its background, and the f'1.nal breakdown of all_ naval limi-
tation is given in a concise manner and will h.elp the reader 
to have a much better understanding of t~..e naval limitation 
novement., 1 ts rise and fall, than can be folmd in the sepa-
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